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1 Introduction
Is the provision of public infrastructures by a local jurisdiction aﬀected by that of
its neighbors? And how is the eﬀect (if any) related to the size of local jurisdictions
in terms of population? A proper answer to these questions can give an important
contribution to the discussion about the optimal boundaries of areas over which public
infrastructures are provided. In fact, this is a hot topic in Europe, where some countries
are rethinking the structure of their public sector (in terms of both the number and the
types of government layers) by relying on two main theoretical arguments, namely the
presence of scale economies and of positive spillovers in infrastructures provision, both
pointing at ineﬃcient levels of infrastructure provision by local jurisdictions that are
too small in size.1
The theoretical literature on fiscal externalities recognizes that there are various
ways in which decisions taken in one jurisdiction may spill-over into other jurisdic-
tions.2 Fiscal policies of regional governments can directly aﬀect the welfare of residents
in neighboring jurisdictions, as for expenditures on public goods and services (e.g., en-
vironmental policies) whose benefits transcend borders. Public policies in one region
can also indirectly aﬀect residents elsewhere through their impact on local governments’
budgets, giving rise to the so-called fiscal externalities (e.g., tax policies that induce tax
base mobility across jurisdictions). Case et al. (1993) is the first systematic empirical
work addressing these issues; using data on expenditures of continental US States over
the period 1970-1985, they find that state government’s per capita expenditure is posi-
tively and significantly aﬀected by that of its neighbors’. Other important studies are
Murdoch et al. (1993) and Solé-Ollé (2006), showing that public expenditure spillovers
are stronger at low levels of government’s layers than at high levels.
There is also a growing literature on fiscal externalities specifically related to the
provision of local infrastructures. Cremer et al. (1997) modelling the provision of lo-
cal infrastructures in a federation in which two communities strategically interact by
comparing the per capita cost of providing infrastructures with the transport cost that
their own citizens must bear to go and enjoy the infrastructures provided by the neigh-
boring community. For given production and transport costs, the decision to provide
1In the celebrated Decentralization Theorem by Oates (1972), the exploitation of scale economies
and the internalization of spillovers account for the benefits of centralization, while uniform public
goods provision in the presence of heterogenous preferences at the local level account for its costs.
2For a comprehensive analysis of the issue, see, e.g., Dahlby (1996).
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infrastructures depends on the size of the community. Haughwout (2002) proposes a
spatial equilibrium model by considering the role of infrastructures in determining the
distribution of economic activity across regions. The empirical evidence suggests that
central cities’ land prices are positively related with public infrastructures provision;
however, as the same author points out, the omission from the model of the costs and
benefits of spillovers might be one of the main causes of the limited local infrastructure
benefits found in the empirical analysis. Buettner et al. (2004), by using German data
on public expenditure of Lander governments, find that the agglomeration level has no
eﬀect on the per capita expenditure on infrastructures; in particular, there is no cost
disadvantage, both for highly urbanized and for sparsely populated regions. Also in
this case, however, one might argue that the results are driven by the assumption of no
spatial interaction between local infrastructures. In fact, if spatial autocorrelation turns
out to be an important expenditure determinant, not accounting for it can yield biased
and inconsistent estimates for many of the determinants of the expenditure equation
(Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002).
In our work, to set the stage for the empirical analysis, we build up a simple theo-
retical model in which two neighboring local jurisdictions independently provide public
infrastructures. If local infrastructures can be consumed by the citizens of both jurisdic-
tions, the model shows that each local government increases (respectively, reduces) its
expenditure on infrastructures in response to an increase in its neighbor’s expenditure
if local infrastructures are complements (respectively, substitutes) in use by citizens.
Public infrastructures like roads, bridges, or dams, are examples of complement infras-
tructures, since they share the property that their benefits from use are higher if also
the neighboring jurisdictions provide the same type of infrastructures on their territory.
If two neighboring jurisdictions provide good roads, and if roads are not used only for
local trips (i.e., confined within the boundaries of a given jurisdiction) but also for
inter-jurisdictional trips, then the benefits from road usage are higher for the residents
of both jurisdictions than in the case in which only one of them provides good roads.
In this sense, local roads, like other types of infrastructures, can be complement in use.
On the contrary, public facilities like theaters, libraries, or sport grounds, are exam-
ples of substitute infrastructures, since the citizens of a given jurisdiction can use either
the facilities provided in their own jurisdiction or those provided in the neighboring
jurisdictions, but never both at the same time.
The theoretical model also shows that, in per capita terms, the size of the reaction
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of expenditure on infrastructures to changes in the expenditure by the neighboring ju-
risdiction is decreasing, in absolute value, in the size of the local jurisdiction. That is,
in per capita terms a highly populated jurisdiction hardly reacts to changes in infras-
tructures of a scarcely populated neighbor, since any given change in the per capita
expenditure of a small jurisdiction has a negligible per capita impact, in terms of public
goods spillovers, on the residents of a large jurisdiction.
In the empirical analysis, we use a dataset containing financial and socioeconomic
variables for the 223 municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province of
Trento. After constructing a measure of the stock of infrastructures provided by mu-
nicipalities, we estimate their determinants by explicitly introducing a spatial lag-error
component. We find robust evidence that some types of public infrastructures are of
the complement type, since in small municipalities their level is positively aﬀected by
the level of infrastructures provided by the neighboring communities. However, and in
accordance with our theoretical predictions, the spatial interaction tends to vanish for
large municipalities.
The work is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 describes the data, Section 4 outlines the estimation strategy and discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
Consider a regional economy composed of two municipalities, labelled i = 1, 2.3 Let Ni
be the population resident in jurisdiction i, and yi its per-capita endowment of income,
exogenously given. Income is used to consume private and local public goods, the latter
financed with a local income tax. We assume that individuals cannot change their
place of residence, although they can move to consume the public good provided in the
neighboring municipality.
Consider, without loss of generality, community 1. The utility function of the rep-
3The fact of limiting the analysis to the case of only two jurisdictions obviously implies that each one
of them is ‘the neighbor’ of the other one. We adopt such a simplified setup for analytical convenience.
A richer, but also more complex, specification is that of the ‘circular region’, a formalization akin to
that used in spatial models of product diﬀerentiation, in which the local jurisdictions are located along
a circle, so that each one of them has two neighbors, one at its left and one at its right of the regional
territory (see Solé-Ollé, 2006, for an application of such a type of framework).
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resentative individual resident in municipality 1 is:
u1(z1, z2) =
⇣
↵1   z1
2
⌘
z1 + ✓
h⇣
↵1   z2
2
⌘
z2 +  z1z2
i
+
⇣
 1   x1
2
⌘
x1, (1)
where zi denotes the eﬀective service-level of public infrastructures provided by mu-
nicipality i on its territory, and x1 the consumption of private goods. The parameters
↵i > 0 and  i > 0 are a measure of the intensity of preferences for the consumption of
public and private goods, respectively.4
The utility function (1) also contains two parameters, ✓ 2 [0, 1] and   2 [ 1, 1],
which are key for the analysis, and that are assumed to be identical in the two juris-
dictions. The parameter ✓ represents a classical positive spillover of local public goods
provision; at one end, ✓ = 1 implies full spillover; at the other end, ✓ = 0 implies no
spillovers.5 A first interpretation is that a share ✓ of the residents in jurisdiction 1 fully
enjoy the public infrastructures located in jurisdiction 2. A second interpretation is
that all residents in jurisdiction 1 enjoy at a ✓% rate the public infrastructures located
in jurisdiction 2.
The parameter   measures instead the degree of complementarity (if positive) or
substitutability (if negative) in the use of public infrastructures provided by the two
jurisdictions.6 For instance, road services provided by the two municipalities are com-
plement in usage if drivers (e.g., commuters, or shoppers) must cross the border in a
typical journey: in this case, it is ✓ > 0,   > 0. Two swimming pools, one located in
each municipality, are instead likely to be substitutes in usage: in this case, it is ✓ > 0,
  < 0. Finally, it is also possible that services provided are neither complements nor
substitutes; in this case, it is ✓ > 0,   = 0. For instance, a swimming pool in one
4Heterogeneity between jurisdictions in terms of the preference parameters ↵i and  i can be due to
geographical factors, demographic factors (e.g., the share of elderly in total population), characteristics
of the local economy, and so on.
5In line with the prevalent literature, we assume that the spillover is automatically determined by
the provision of local infrastructures. It is possible to extend our framework to the more realistic case
in which the eﬀective level of enjoyment depends on usage levels, endogenously chosen by individuals
of the two jurisdictions.
6Most models analyzing local public goods spillovers assume that the total amount of public goods
enjoyed by the residents of any given jurisdiction is equal to a weighted sum of the ‘home’ and the
‘neighbors’ public goods supplies, which means that the public goods provided by diﬀerent jurisdictions
are perfect substitutes (in our model, this case is obtained by setting   =  1). The more general
functional form of the utility function given in Eq. (1) is widely used in oligopolistic models with
product diﬀerentiation (see, e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984).
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jurisdiction, and a public library in the other one, are likely to be independent in usage
by the residents of both jurisdictions.
In any given jurisdiction i, the per-capita eﬀective service-level of public infrastruc-
tures depends on total expenditure, Ei, and on the total number of users, N˜i, according
to the function:7
zi =
Ei
N˜ ri
, i = 1, 2, (2)
where r 2 [0, 1] and
N˜1 = N1 + ✓N2, N˜2 = N2 + ✓N1. (3)
Consistently with the utility function defined in Eq. (1), Eq. (3) shows that public
infrastructures provided in a given jurisdiction are fully enjoyed by all its residents and
by a share ✓ of the residents in the neighboring jurisdiction or, alternatively, that they
are fully enjoyed by all its residents while they are enjoyed at a reduced ✓% rate by all
non-residents. In Eq. (2), the parameter r, which is identical for the two jurisdictions,
captures the degree of congestion in the use of public infrastructures. At one end, r = 0
implies non rivalry in the use of public services; at the other end, r = 1 implies that
public services are fully rival. Note that while the parameter r defines the degree of
rivalness in consumption within the boundaries of the jurisdiction in which the public
good is provided, the spillover parameter ✓ defines the degree of non-rivalness in spatial
terms, so that ✓ = 0 defines a purely local good whereas ✓ = 1 defines a purely ‘national’
good.
Let ti be the per capita local tax and gi an unconditional grant, in per-capita
terms, received by municipality i from an upper tier of government (e.g., the regional
government). By substituting the local government budget constraint, Ni(ti+gi) = Ei,
into the representative individual’s budget constraint, xi = yi   ti, we obtain the local
economy resource constraint:
xi = yi + gi   Ei
Ni
. (4)
2.1 Investment in public infrastructures
Local policy makers simultaneously and independently set their own expenditures on
infrastructures with the aim of maximizing the welfare of the representative resident.
7Note that the specification given in Eq. (2), by which the stock variable z1 is a function of the flow
variable Ei, implicitly assumes full depretiation of the expenditure in infrastructures within the time
period. That is, we consider a simple static model instead of a more complex dynamic framerwork.
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Formally, and considering, without loss of generality, municipality 1, the policy maker
chooses public expenditure E1 to maximize Eq. (1), subject to Eqs. (2) and (4) for
i = 1, taking as given the public expenditure E2 of municipality 2.
The first order condition of the given problem is:
@u1
@E1
= (↵1   z1 + ✓ z2) @z1
@E1
+ ( 1   x1) @x1
@E1
= 0,
that can be written as: 
↵1   E1
N˜ r1
+ ✓ 
E2
N˜ r2
!
1
N˜ r1
 
✓
 1   y1   g1 + E1
N1
◆
1
N1
= 0. (5)
By solving Eq. (5) with respect to E1, we obtain the best response (or reaction)
function:
E˜1(E2, N1, N2) =
 
↵1
N˜ r1
   1   y1   g1
N1
+
✓ 
N˜ r1 N˜
r
2
E2
!, 
1
N21
+
1
N˜2r1
!
. (6)
The second order suﬃcient condition for a maximum holds true, since:
@2u1
@E21
=  
✓
@z1
@E1
◆2
 
✓
@x1
@E1
◆2
=  
 
1
N21
+
1
N˜2r1
!
< 0.
A similar best response function, denoted by E˜2(E1, N2, N1), can be obtained for
municipality 2. By combining the two functions, one can solve for the Nash equilibrium
in the public expenditure levels of the two municipalities.8 We characterize the factors
that determine the sign and the size of the slope of the reaction function (6). In fact,
the latter represents the key interaction eﬀect for the expenditure decisions of local
governments that we try to assess in our empirical analysis.
2.2 The slope of the reaction function
By linearity of the best response function (6), it is immediate to obtain its slope as:
@E˜1
@E2
=
✓ 
N˜ r1 N˜
r
2
, 
1
N21
+
1
N˜2r1
!
. (7)
Provided that the benefits of public infrastructures spill-over across jurisdictions
(i.e., ✓ > 0), Eq. (7) shows that the sign of the slope of the reaction function is
8If a stable Nash equilibrium exists, then it is unique, since the reactions functions are linear in
the expenditure levels. On the normative side, it is possible to show that in general the expenditure
decisions emerging in the Nash equilibrium are not eﬃcient, since local policy makers do not internalize
the positive spillovers of public expenditure accruing to the residents in the other municipality.
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determined by the sign of the parameter  , expressing complementarity (when positive)
or substitutability (when negative) of public infrastructures services in the neighboring
jurisdictions. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 Assume that local infrastructures services spill-over across jurisdictions
(i.e., ✓ > 0). If the services provided by the two jurisdictions are complements in
consumption by citizens (i.e.,   > 0), then the best response function relating the optimal
public expenditure levels of one jurisdiction to the public expenditure levels of the other
jurisdiction is positively sloped. It is instead negatively sloped if the services provided by
the two jurisdictions are substitutes in consumption (i.e.,   < 0).
Quite obviously, if public services provided by the two jurisdictions are neither comple-
ments nor substitutes in use (i.e.,   = 0), then public expenditure in each jurisdiction is
independent of that in the other jurisdiction, even in the presence of positive spillovers.
2.3 The role of population size
In this section we explore how the population size aﬀects the terms of the strategic
interaction between the two local governments. Let ei = Ei/Ni denote per capita
public expenditure in jurisdiction i. Expressed in per capita terms, the slope of the
best response function is equal to:
@e˜1
@e2
=
✓
N2
N1
◆
@E˜1
@E2
.
Using Eqs. (7) and (3), the latter expression can be written as:
@e˜1
@e2
=
✓
N2
N1
◆
✓ 
(N1 + ✓N2)r(N2 + ✓N1)r
  ✓
1
N21
+
1
(N1 + ✓N2)2r
◆
. (8)
We are interested in examining how the size of the slope shown in Eq. (8) is aﬀected
by changes in N1, for given N2, by focusing on some specific, but relevant, cases. In
particular, assuming maximal spillovers (i.e., ✓ = 1), we consider in turn the two ‘polar’
cases of services that are fully non-rival (i.e., r = 0) and fully rival (i.e., r = 1) in
consumption.
If ✓ = 1 and r = 0, then Eq. (8) reduces to:
@e˜1
@e2
    
✓=1,r=0
=
 N2
1
N1
+N1
. (9)
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Eq. (9) shows that, for given   and N2, the slope of the best response function is,
in absolute value, decreasing in N1 > 1, since:
@2e˜1
@e2@N1
    
✓=1,r=0
=    N2, where   = N1   1
1 +N1
> 0 for N1 > 1.
Substituting for ✓ = 1 and r = 1 into Eq. (8), and then diﬀerentiating with respect
to N1, we get:
@2e˜1
@e2@N1
    
✓=1,r=1
=   ⌘N2, where ⌘ = N
2
1 + (N1 +N2)(N1  N2)⇥
N21 + (N1 +N2)
⇤2 > 0 iﬀ N1 > N2p2 .
The latter expression shows that, for given   and N2, the slope of the best response
function is, in absolute value, decreasing in N1, provided that N1 > N2/
p
2, i.e., that
jurisdiction 1 is not too small relative to the neighboring jurisdiction 2.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume maximal spillovers ✓ = 1. If r = 0, that is if services of
local infrastructures are non-rival in use, then the size of the slope of the best response
function of jurisdiction i is, in absolute value, decreasing in its population Ni, for given
population Nj of the neighboring jurisdiction j. If r = 1, that is if services are rival
in use, then the size of the slope of the best response function of jurisdiction i is, in
absolute value, decreasing in Ni, for given Nj, provided that Ni > Nj/
p
2.
The intuition behind these results is simple. In per capita terms, a large jurisdiction has
little incentives to react to changes in the infrastructures level by a small neighboring
community, as any given change in the per capita expenditure of the latter brings about
benefit spillovers to the residents in the large community that are, in per capita terms,
very small.9
3 The empirical analysis
The model presented in the previous section is tested by using a dataset on the 223
municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province of Trento. Italy counts
9Although no analytical solutions are available for the general case in which r 2 (0, 1) and ✓ < 1, by
means of numerical simulations it is possible to show that the results of Proposition 2 are robust. In
particular, for r suﬃciently close to zero, the slope of the best response function is, in absolute value,
decreasing in N1, for given N2. Instead, for r suﬃciently close to 1, it is decreasing in N1 provided
that N1 is above a given threshold N¯ , with N¯ < N2. Details of the simulations are available from upon
request.
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four administrative government layers: the central authority and, at the local level,
Regions, Provinces and Municipalities. While most Regions and Provinces are ruled by
‘ordinary’ statutes, some of them — the ‘autonomous’ Regions and Provinces — are
ruled by ‘special’ statutes.10 Autonomy means wider competencies on public functions
than those attributed to Ordinary Regions and Provinces, as well as the right to cash
almost all tax revenues that originate at the local level. In particular, the Province of
Trento cashes 90% of all revenues from central taxes that originate on its territory, while
the remaining 10% is withheld by the central government. Thanks to its autonomy, the
Province of Trento is a very interesting experimental framework, as fiscal federal theory
can be tested within a simple institutional setting in which there are only two govern-
ment layers: the Province in the role of the central authority and the Municipalities in
the role of local authorities, with the latter financing their expenditure functions with
own revenues and transfers from the Province.
At the municipal level, own revenues include a property tax and a range of user-
fees,11 while provincial transfers are in part of the ‘specific’ type (i.e., targeted to specific
expenditure functions) and in part of the ‘general’ type, with the latter allocated by
means of formulas based on fiscal needs and fiscal capacities of the municipalities.
On the expenditure side, budgetary data distinguish between ‘recurrent’ and ‘capital’
outlays. Our focus is on the latter type of expenditures, since they build up over time
the stock of public infrastructures.
3.1 Data and variables
The main variable in the dataset is the yearly capital expenditure, in real terms,12 for
the 223 municipalities over the period 1990-2007, divided into 12 functions that reflect
investments on diﬀerent types of infrastructures. We also collected data on the capital
transfers granted by the Province of Trento to its municipalities, since this source of
10Italy counts five Autonomous Regions (Sicily and Sardinia, which are insular territories, and Valle
d’Aosta, Trentino Alto-Adige, and Friuli Venezia-Giulia, which are northern boundary territories) and
two Autonomus Provinces (Trento and Bolzano, making up the Trentino Alto-Adige Region).
11For the period covered by our study, the main local tax at the municipal level is ICI (Imposta
Comunale sugli Immobili), which is based on the cadastral value of real estates and on the market
value of building lots. Minor taxes include a surcharge on the personal income tax and a surcharge on
the tax on electricity consumption. User charges include waste collection and fees for public services
such as public transport, nursery schools, and so on.
12We used the 2007 base year deflator for gross fixed capital formation computed by the “Autorità
per l’Energia” (www.autorita.energia.it).
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revenues is an important determinant of investment outlays.13 The provincial capital
transfers are in part of the specific type (i.e., earmarked to specific infrastructural
projects in one of the 12 expenditure functions) and in part of the general type (usually
formula-based, with reference to measures of fiscal needs and fiscal capacities).14
We build a measure of the municipal capital stock (i.e., the endowment of infrastruc-
tures) by applying the perpetual inventory method (see, e.g. Goldsmith, 1951; Meinen
et al., 1998), according to which the capital stock at time t is assumed to be equal
to the capital stock at time t   1, net of depreciation (if any), plus gross investment
(capital expenditure) at time t. In our benchmark definition of the capital stock, we
consider year 2001 as the initial capital stock, given that all the control variables are
available from 2001 to 2007: the initial 2001 capital stock is computed by summing
the yearly expenditure flows over the twelve-year period from 1990 to 2001. Assuming
no depreciation, the 2002 capital stock is then obtained by adding to the 2001 stock
the 2002 expenditure, and similarly for the following years from 2003 to 2007. Hence
we end up with a seven-year series of municipal capital stock for the period 2001-2007.
However, the capital stock does not show great variance between years, since infrastruc-
tural investments that typically take several years to be completed usually appear in
the municipal budgets as uniform annual quota of expenditures. Furthermore, not all
the controls (see below) are either available for each one of the years 2001-2007 or, when
available, they do not show great variance between years. Therefore, in the empirical
analysis of Section 4 we use a cross-sectional dataset instead of a panel, by using as
dependent variable the average value of the capital stocks for the period 2001-2007.15
13There is also a well known literature on the eﬀects of grants on public expenditure, usually finding
that grants can stimulate government expenditures more than monetary transfers to individuals of the
same amount (Gramlich, 1977). Hence, a quota of the federal money sticks to the public sector instead
of being distributed to citizens (the so-called flypaper eﬀect). Interestingly, Wyckoﬀ (1991) finds that
capital expenditures are particularly sensitive to grants.
14Data on general transfers cover the period 1991-2007 and acconut for about 60% of capital ex-
penditures of all municipalities. Specific transfers cover only the period 2001-2007 since for the period
1991-2000 there was no distinction between the two categories of transfers in budgetary data. For the
period 2001-2007, total transfers account for about 68% of capital expenditure, with specific transfers
accounting for about 60% of the total.
15To compute the per capita value of the 2001-2007 stock, we divide it by the average population over
the same period. To test the robustness of the results, we built several diﬀerent measures of the capital
stock, and found no significant changes (the details are available upon request). In particular, we
computed the initial capital stock in year 1994 (obtaining a 14-year series) and in year 2006 (obtaining
a 2-year series), assuming no depreciation. Then we also considered linear depreciation rates of 2%,
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The per capita value of the average capital stocks for the period 2001-2007 is about
16,671 euros. Table 1 shows that almost 75% of the total stock is concentrated on three
expenditure functions, namely Administration & Management, Roads & Transport and
Planning & Environment. Moreover, these three functions are also those for which, in
every year considered, all municipalities have a positive expenditure. For these reasons,
our empirical analysis focuses on the determinants of four measures of infrastructural
endowments: the total stock and the three above mentioned functions.
Table 1: Summary statistics on the infrastructural stocksTable 1: Summary statistics on the infrastructural stocks 
Expenditure Function Per Capita 
Value (euro) 
Percentage on 
the total 
Number 
of zeros 
% of observations 
with zero 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Administration & Management 3,625.57 21.75 0 0.00 
Municipal police 7.39 0.04 210 94.17 
Justice  236.09 1.42 25 11.21 
Education 966.39 5.80 20 8.97 
Culture 463.25 2.78 8 3.59 
Sport 947.73 5.68 18 8.07 
Tourism 226.63 1.36 85 38.12 
Roads & Transport services 4,688.47 28.12 0 0.00 
Planning & Environment 4,172.41 25.03 0 0.00 
Social welfare 816.42 4.90 6 2.69 
Economic development 468.83 2.81 63 28.25 
In-house productive  services 51.83 0.31 152 68.16 
TOTAL 16,671.01 100.00   
 
 
Table 2: Moran Spatial Statistic 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Moran I statistic 0.14*** 0.08** 0.18*** 0.06* 
Notes: The spatial matrix used to compute the Moran test is a binary, contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are neighbors if 
they share a border, and is row-standardized. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to the control variables, we build up a measure of the provincial capital
grants (grants) using the same method outlined above for the capital stock. As for the
other variables, the dataset includes demographic, territorial and socioeconomic data
that can be relevant determinants of infrastructural stocks. The average altitude level,
from 2001 Census, of the municipal territory (altitude) can account for the fact that
providing public services in the mountains requires ‘greater’, hence more costly, infras-
tructures than in plains. The number of residents (population, the 2001-2007 average
value) can capture the presence of scale economies in infrastructures provision. The
3%, 4% and 5%, which are in line with those used in similar studies estimating the stock of public
infrastructures, such as those carried by the World Bank (Agénor et al., 2005; Arestoﬀ and Hurlin,
2006) and the IMF (Kamps, 2006). For the Italian case, Marrocu and Paci (2008) use a 4% depreciation
rate to build a measure of the capital stock series for the period 1996-2003 at the regional level.
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shares (also in this case we refer to the 2001-2007 average value) of inhabitants older
than 65 (aged) and of those aged 0-5 (child) can account for some specific infrastruc-
tural needs (e.g., infant schools, nursing homes for elderly). The per capita number
of houses (houses), from 2001 Census, can capture the demand for public infrastruc-
tures from resident households, as well as those linked to tourism activities, since the
variable includes also holiday properties. The per capita number of employees (from
2001 Census) in both the public and the private sector, (total employees), as well as
the per capita number of firms (from 2001 Census) in the private sector (local units),
can proxy the demand for public infrastructures from the productive sector. Finally, in
order to capture a possible link between expenditure variation and population change
we include the population growth rate (growth), defined as the percentange diﬀerence
between the population average in 2001-2007 and that in 1991-1997.16
A peculiarity of the Province is the presence of 16 ‘communities’, each one formed by
several contiguous municipalities belonging to an homogenous geographic and economic
area. By means of their community, the municipalities jointly provide some public
services that benefit the whole area covered by the community, thus realizing some
economies of scale and spillover internalization. Since the community of aﬃliation can
bear some weight in the investment decisions of a municipality, we include as a control
a dummy variable for each community (communities dummy).
In order to control for the outliers, we compute the interquartile range (IQR) for
all the dependent variables, picking up those observations (outliers) passing over the
left or right boundary and defining accordingly a dummy variable (outliers dummy).17
Finally, we define a dummy variable (metropolitan dummy), equal to one for the two
most populated cities in the Province, which are Trento (about 110,000 inhabitants)
and Rovereto (about 35,000 inhabitants). These are by far the biggest cities, since the
other 221 municipalities have an average population of about 1,600 inhabitants.
Summary statistics, data description and data sources of all the variables used in
the analysis are reported in Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2, while Table A3 provides
the list of municipalities outliers.
16The years 1991 and 2001 are the census years and 2007 is the last year of the dataset.
17We used the IQR stata command, which allows for the detection of both mild and severe ouliers.
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4 Econometric specification
Estimation of the standard empirical model of public expenditure through a linear speci-
fication might not take into account expenditures and or economic shocks in neighboring
municipalities which can be correlated with exogenous controls and so lead to biased
and inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002). There-
fore, before deciding upon the econometric strategy, we need to know whether the data
present spatial dependence among municipalities.
To do so we first need to define spatial variables. We build a matrix of neighbors
to each municipality based upon their geographical location, which can be expressed
through a (223⇥223) matrix, such that the element corresponding to row a and column
b is 1 if the spatial units a and b are geographically neighbors, and zero otherwise. We
then make a row standardization such that the elements of each row sum to one; note
also that, since all neighbors have the same weight, all elements of a row are identical.
Hence, the product of the (223⇥ 223) matrix by the (223⇥ 1) vector of expenditure
levels yields for each municipality a simple average of its neighboring municipalities
expenditure.
We compute the traditional measure of spatial dependence that is the Moran’s spa-
tial statistics (Cliﬀ and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988) for the per capita Total Infrastruc-
tures and for the three selected sub-functions, Administration & Management, Roads &
Transport and Planning & Environment. As Table 2 shows, all our variables of interest
exibit a spatial pattern of postive autocorrelation that is stronger for both expenditures
in Total Infrastructures and Roads and Transport.
Table 2: Moran spatial statistic
Table 1: Summary statistics on the infrastructural stocks 
Expenditure Function Per Capita 
Value (euro) 
Percentage on 
the total 
Number 
of zeros 
% of observations 
with zero 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Administration & Management 3,625.57 21.75 0 0.00 
Municipal police 7.39 0.04 210 94.17 
Justice  236.09 1.42 25 11.21 
Education 966.39 5.80 20 8.97 
Culture 463.25 2.78 8 3.59 
Sport 947.73 5.68 18 8.07 
Tourism 226.63 1.36 85 38.12 
Roads & Transport services 4,688.47 28.12 0 0.00 
Planning & Environment 4,172.41 25.03 0 0.00 
Social welfare 816.42 4.90 6 2.69 
Economic development 468.83 2.81 63 28.25 
In-house productive  services 51.83 0.31 152 68.16 
TOTAL 16,671.01 100.00   
 
 
Table 2: Moran Spatial Statistic 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Moran I statistic 0.14*** 0.08** 0.18*** 0.06* 
Notes: The spatial matrix used to compute the Moran test is a binary, contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are 
neighbors if they share a border, and is row-standardized. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the result of the Moran test is unable to descriminate properly between
spatial-lag and spatial-error dependence.18 Hence, in order to obtain a more precise
18There are two primary types of spatial dependence. The spatial error dependence occurs when the
error terms across diﬀerent spatial units are correlated. In this case the OLS assumption of uncorrelated
error terms is violated and hence the estimates are biased. Spatial error is due to omitted (spatially
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indication of which is the most likely source of spatial dependence, we perform the
two robust Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests proposed by Anselin et al. (1996),19 which
are based on the OLS residuals of a non-spatial regression model, using all the control
variables described in Section 3.1. Table A4 shows that the robust LM tests indicate the
presence of spatial lag dependence for Total Infrastructures (the robust LM test value is
3.53 and statistically significant at 10%) while for the Roads & Transport expenditure
function the spatial pattern appears to be driven by both spatial lag and spatial error,
even though the test statistic for the former (the robust LM test statistic is 9.50 and
statistically significant at 1%) is larger than that for the latter (the robust LM test
statistic is 6.05 and statistically significant at 5%). On the other hand, the robust
LM test for the Planning & Environment expenditure function suggests the presence of
spatial dependence in the error term (the test is equal to 5.44 and statistically signficant
at 5%), while for Administration & Management the robust LM test does not indicate
the presence of neither spatial lag nor spatial error dependence.
For each one of the four infrastructural measures, we now proceed to estimate the
slope of the reaction function characterized in Proposition 1, and then test for the results
in Proposition 2, by estimating whether the size of the slope of the reaction function
depends on population size.
4.1 Strategic interaction evidence
Using the per-capita neighbors’ average expenditure, we first estimate the OLS coeﬃ-
cients (Table 3, columns 1, 3, 5 and 7). Moreover, since the spatial tests shown above
suggest the presence of diﬀerent patterns of spatial dependence for the four infrastruc-
tural measures we focus on, we perform a three-step procedure developed by Kelejian
and Prucha (1998) to estimate a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive dis-
turbance (Table 3, columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) taking into account both the source of spatial
dependence (spatial-lag and spatial-error) by using as instruments the average of all
correlated) covariates that, if not attended, would bias the estimate. Spatial error models sort out of
the problem by estimating the coeﬃcient of the spatial error. The spatial lag dependence implies that
the dependent variable y in jurisdiction i is aﬀected by independent variables of jurisdiction i and j
and hence the dependent variable of j also aﬀects it, and vice-versa. The assumption of uncorrelated
error terms and independent observations is violated and therefore the regression estimates are biased.
The solution to this puzzle can be that of instrumenting the endogenous spatial lag (i.e., the dependent
variable of j entering in the estimate of the dependent variable of i).
19Both LM-statistics are Chi-Square distibuted with one degree of freedom.
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neighbor’s exogenous variables and correcting for heteroskedasticity of unknown form
(GS2SLS Robust; see Drukker et al., 2010, 2011, for details).
The estimated spatial lag coeﬃcient,  , for Total Infrastructures is 0.17 and 1%
significant while the spatial error coeﬃcient, ⇢, is not significant (Table 3, col. 2). The
positive coeﬃcient suggests that municipalities tend to increase their own infrastructure
spending as a response to the rising expenditure of their neighboring municipalities, thus
confirming the hypothesis of horizontal expenditure spillovers with complementarity in
use; that is, in terms of the model in Section 2, the estimated coeﬃcient   is consistent
with the existence of positive spillovers (✓ > 0) and complementarity in use (  > 0),
which implies best responde functions that are positively sloped. As for the specific
expenditure functions, for Road & Transport we find a 1% signficant and positive coef-
ficient of 0.25 for the spatial lag coeﬃcient,  , and a negative spatial error coeﬃcient
of 0.44 (5% singificant), indicating that both types of spatial dependence coexist in the
model (Table 3, col. 6). For Planning & Environment the estimated spatial lag coef-
ficient is not significant but in this case we find a negative and 5% significant spatial
error coeﬃcient of magnitude  0.47 (Table 3, col. 8). Finally, for the Administra-
tion & Management expenditure function we do not find any evidence of horizontal
strategic interaction, since neither the spatial-lag nor the spatial-error coeﬃcient are
statistically diﬀerent from zero (Table 3, col. 4). These results confirm those of the
spatial auto-correlation tests illustrated in Tables 2 and A4. The reason is that the
Road & Transport function contains investments on infrastructures that are comple-
ment in use, like roads and bridges, since the benefits from use of the infrastructure in
one jurisdiction are higher if also the neighboring jurisdictions provide the same type of
infrastructures on their territory. In the Planning & Environment function, where the
expenditure is related to infrastructures like dams, the spatial link in expenditure does
not hold. However, there is a spatial link in the residuals of the estimate, which can be
explained by some missing spatial variable reflected by the significance in the spatial
error coeﬃcient. Finally, in the Adminstration & Management function, which contains
expenditures for buildings and facilities necessary to provide purely local administrative
services, we do not find any spatial link, since there are no spillovers in use (✓ = 0, in
terms of the model in Section 2).
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Table 3: Spatial model estimation resultsTable 3: Spatial model estimation results 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
λ 0.10* 0.17*** -0.17* -0.03 0.14* 0.25*** -0.03 0.19 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) 
ρ 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.44** 
 
-0.47** 
  
(0.16) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.19) 
Grants 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.37** 0.37** 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) 
Altitude 4.31*** 3.83*** 1.33 1.18 1.61** 1.44** 0.75 0.48 
 
(1.47) (1.29) (0.90) (0.79) (0.79) (0.65) (1.01) (0.87) 
Population -0.07* -0.07** -0.06** -0.06** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03* -0.03** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Houses 2,509.36*** 2,520.73*** 446.31 391.00 633.78* 553.40* 1,290.00** 1,129.69*** 
 
(883.25) (812.42) (527.35) (491.88) (380.58) (334.17) (501.19) (416.22) 
Aged 1,969.37 1,113.78 3,885.67 2,863.65 -1,603.27 -3,598.87 7,444.27 7,796.44 
 
(9,428.57) (8,908.13) (6,030.13) (6,095.43) (4,648.27) (4,038.59) (5,463.26) (4,872.74) 
Children 607.58 -3,717.58 -2,784.41 -5,084.36 -14,927.14 -16,478.47 11,248.30 5,203.81 
 
(30,717.96) (28,556.94) (18,234.70) (17,034.96) (20,203.51) (18,083.26) (16,124.65) (14,392.43) 
Population density -0.83 -0.72 -0.46 -0.34 0.30 0.34 -0.31 -0.20 
 
(0.86) (0.78) (0.51) (0.44) (0.37) (0.31) (0.48) (0.40) 
Population growth 4,595.67 4,509.20 -2,203.88 -2,162.01 -1,762.93 -2,020.82 -416.09 -150.50 
 
(4,267.68) (3,894.62) (3,181.63) (2,927.71) (2,367.13) (2,218.06) (3,124.13) (2,585.39) 
Total employees 4,176.50 4,136.67 1,997.99 1,998.71 1,014.33 903.37 91.68 666.79 
 
(3,153.76) (2,872.37) (2,095.22) (1,916.08) (1,246.07) (1,171.68) (1,670.28) (1,435.63) 
Local unit 16,940.34 17,513.38 7,418.23 6,664.84 201.99 1,013.53 341.13 293.50 
 
(12,216.94) (11,371.28) (7,250.13) (6,699.34) (5,564.78) (5,066.46) (7,977.42) (7,186.91) 
Outliers dummy 10,167.77** 10,676.13*** 8,286.30*** 8,370.97*** 7,490.02*** 7,646.37*** 8,541.15*** 8,514.42*** 
 
(4,115.77) (3,944.14) (1,171.37) (1,141.15) (1,011.15) (906.81) (1,671.18) (1,443.07) 
Metropolitan dummy 3,667.06 3,693.94 1,457.60 1,603.52 993.67 1,483.74 448.00 251.21 
 
(2,529.95) (2,589.14) (1,410.58) (1,495.82) (1,171.10) (1,464.50) (1,070.78) (1,059.25) 
Constant -3,169.04 -3,278.43 -757.66 -598.66 1,138.46 1,408.10 -1,229.46 -1,821.05 
 
(2,911.58) (2,688.47) (1,975.98) (1,909.38) (1,689.41) (1,466.95) (1,711.60) (1,469.92) 
Communities dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 
R-squared 0.91   0.72   0.86   0.82   
Notes: Columns (1), (3) ,(5) and (7) display OLS robust estimator results by using, respectively, total per-capita expenditure, administration and 
management per-capita expenditure, road and traffic per-capita expenditure and planning and environment per-capita expenditure as dependent 
variables. Columns (2), (4) ,(6) and (8) show the spatial lag-error model estimation results by using GS2SLS (Generalized method of moment and 
instrumental variables) robust estimator correcting for heteroskedasticity issues of unknown form. The spatial weight matrix (W) used is of the type: 
contiguity-based and it is row-standardized. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant 
at 10%. 
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4.2 The impact of the population size
In this section we extend our empirical analysis by interacting the average of neighbor’s
per capita expenditure with the population.20 We first estimate a spatial model in
which we account for the interaction term by OLS (Table 4, columns 1, 4, 7 and 10).21
We then use the GS2SLS estimator (Table 4, columns 2, 5, 8 and 11) where we account
only for the endogeneity issue of the spatial parameter, but we do not instrument its
interaction with the population. In order to check whether the results obtained from
GS2SLS regression are robust to possible endogenity bias due to the interaction term
we also include, as additional instruments, the product of the neighbor’s exogenous
variables with population (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12, Table 4).
The spatial interaction parameter,  , is significantly diﬀerent from zero for To-
tal Infrastructures in all three specifications: OLS (col. 1), GS2SLS (col. 2) where
only neighbor’s infrastructure are instrumented with all neighbors exogenous variables,
and GS2SLS (col. 3) where neighbor’s infrastructure are instrumented with all neigh-
bors exogenous variables and the product of neighbors’infrastructure with population
is instrumented with the product of neighbor’s exogenous variables with population,
confirming that municipalities’ infrastructures are positively aﬀected by those of the
neighbors. Also for the Roads & Transports expenditure function   remains signifi-
cantly diﬀerent from zero in all three specifications. We also find evidence of horizontal
spending spillovers for Planning & Environment, since   turns out to be significantly
diﬀerent from zero at 10% in the specification when we instrument only for neighbor’s
infrastructure (col. 11) and in the specification when both neighbor’s infrastructure and
the product of neighbors’infrastructure with population are instrumented (col. 12).
In columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4 we find evidence that the externality eﬀect on
Total Infrastructures is driven by population (in fact the intercation term neighbors
spending*population is equal to  0.39, 5% significant in the specification in column
1;  0.45, 1% significant in the specification in column 2;  0.39, 5% significant in
the specification in column 3), and then, inspecting more in detail we observe that
this result is entirely due to the Roads & Transport expenditure function (columns
20To test the robustness of our results, we have also taken into account the relative size of a mu-
nicipality with respct to its neighbors by interacting the average of neighbor’s per capita expenditure
with the ratio between population and the average of neighbor’s population, finding no changes in the
results. Results are available upon request.
21The results of the non-spatial regression model are reported in Table A5.
18
7, 8 and 9), for which the interaction term is negative ( 1.17, 1% singificant in the
specification in column 7;  1.23, 1% significant in the specification in column 8 and
 1.00, 1% significant in the specification in column 9). For Planning & Environment
the interaction term is negative but, however, is statistically not diﬀerent from zero
(col. 10, col. 11 and 12). Finally, for Administration & Management the spatial
coeﬃcients and the interaction turns out to be statistically not diﬀerent from zero in all
the specifications, apart in the OLS specification (col. 4) where the spatial parameter
  is negative ( 0.20) and statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10%.
As for the spatial error coeﬃcient, ⇢, it is not significantly diﬀerent from zero for
Total Infrastructures (in both specifications at column 2 and 3) while it is significant for
both Road & Transport ( 0.44, 1% significant in the specification in col. 8 and  0.46,
1% significant in the specification in col. 9) and Planning & Environment ( 0.41, 5%
significant in the specification in col. 11 and  0.45, 5% significant in the specification
in col. 12).
Our results show that Total Infrastructures are positively determined by the neigh-
bor’s infrastructure and so, by using Proposition 1, we can say that infrastructures
aﬀecting the provision of neighbor’s infrastructures are complements: this result is
strongly determined by Roads & Transport infrastructures. Moreover, the population
of the municipality plays an important role, for both Total Infrastructures and Roads
& Transport, in determining the size of the slope of the reaction function (confirming
the result in Proposition 2); in particular, as the population increases the slope of the
reaction function decreases.
19
Ta
bl
e
4:
Sp
at
ia
lm
od
el
an
d
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
po
pu
la
ti
on
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
No
tes
: C
ol
um
ns
 (1
), 
(4
), 
(7
) a
nd
 (1
0)
 d
isp
la
y 
O
LS
 ro
bu
st
 e
st
im
at
or
 re
su
lts
 b
y 
us
in
g,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 to
ta
l p
er
-c
ap
ita
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
er
-c
ap
ita
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, r
oa
d 
an
d 
tra
ffi
c 
pe
r-
ca
pi
ta
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
nd
 p
la
nn
in
g 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
pe
r-
ca
pi
ta
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
s 
de
pe
nd
en
t 
va
ria
bl
es
. 
C
ol
um
ns
 (
2)
, 
(5
), 
(8
) 
an
d 
(1
1)
 s
ho
w
 t
he
 s
pa
tia
l 
la
g-
er
ro
r 
m
od
el
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
 b
y 
us
in
g 
G
S2
SL
S 
(G
en
er
al
iz
ed
 m
et
ho
d 
of
 m
om
en
t 
an
d 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ria
bl
es
) 
ro
bu
st
 e
st
im
at
or
 c
or
re
ct
in
g 
fo
r 
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
 is
su
es
 o
f u
nk
no
w
n 
fo
rm
. C
ol
um
ns
 (3
), 
(6
), 
(9
) a
nd
 (1
2)
 re
pl
ic
at
e 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
by
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
la
g 
of
 th
e 
ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
va
ria
bl
es
 m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
as
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. T
he
 s
pa
tia
l w
ei
gh
t m
at
rix
 (W
) u
se
d 
is
 o
f t
he
 
ty
pe
: 
co
nt
ig
ui
ty
-b
as
ed
 
an
d 
it 
is 
ro
w
-s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d.
 
R
ob
us
t 
st
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
rs
 
ar
e 
sh
ow
n 
in
 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s. 
**
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
at
 
1%
; 
**
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
at
 
5%
; 
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
at
 
10
%
.
 
To
ta
l 
A
dm
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
&
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
R
oa
ds
 &
 T
ra
ns
po
rt 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 &
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0)
 
(1
1)
 
(1
2)
 
λ 
0.
14
**
 
0.
21
**
* 
0.
21
**
* 
-0
.2
1*
 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
8 
0.
25
**
* 
0.
35
**
* 
0.
34
**
* 
0.
01
 
0.
21
* 
0.
23
* 
 
(0
.0
6)
 
(0
.0
5)
 
(0
.0
5)
 
(0
.1
1)
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.0
8)
 
(0
.0
7)
 
(0
.0
7)
 
(0
.1
4)
 
(0
.1
3)
 
(0
.1
3)
 
ρ 
 
-0
.1
8 
-0
.1
9 
 
-0
.2
4 
-0
.1
8 
 
-0
.4
4*
**
 
-0
.4
6*
**
 
 
-0
.4
1*
* 
-0
.4
5*
* 
 
 
(0
.1
6)
 
(0
.1
7)
 
 
(0
.1
5)
 
(0
.1
4)
 
 
(0
.1
6)
 
(0
.1
7)
 
 
(0
.1
8)
 
(0
.1
9)
 
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 sp
en
di
ng
 *
 P
op
ul
at
io
n 
-0
.3
9*
* 
-0
.4
5*
**
 
-0
.3
9*
* 
0.
25
 
0.
19
 
0.
27
 
-1
.1
7*
**
 
-1
.2
3*
**
 
-1
.0
0*
**
 
-0
.2
7 
-0
.2
1 
-0
.1
5 
 
(0
.1
8)
 
(0
.1
7)
 
(0
.1
6)
 
(0
.2
5)
 
(0
.2
0)
 
(0
.2
3)
 
(0
.3
3)
 
(0
.2
9)
 
(0
.2
7)
 
(0
.2
3)
 
(0
.2
3)
 
(0
.2
3)
 
G
ra
nt
s 
0.
86
**
* 
0.
84
**
* 
0.
84
**
* 
0.
37
**
 
0.
37
**
 
0.
37
**
 
0.
78
**
* 
0.
76
**
* 
0.
76
**
* 
0.
71
**
* 
0.
73
**
* 
0.
73
**
* 
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.0
8)
 
(0
.1
8)
 
(0
.1
6)
 
(0
.1
6)
 
(0
.1
3)
 
(0
.1
2)
 
(0
.1
2)
 
(0
.1
5)
 
(0
.1
3)
 
(0
.1
3)
 
A
lti
tu
de
 
4.
65
**
* 
4.
22
**
* 
4.
10
**
* 
1.
15
 
0.
99
 
1.
01
 
1.
99
**
 
1.
79
**
* 
1.
68
**
* 
0.
65
 
0.
37
 
0.
34
 
 
(1
.4
2)
 
(1
.2
5)
 
(1
.2
5)
 
(0
.9
1)
 
(0
.8
0)
 
(0
.7
9)
 
(0
.7
7)
 
(0
.6
4)
 
(0
.6
3)
 
(1
.0
1)
 
(0
.8
7)
 
(0
.8
7)
 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
0.
48
* 
0.
57
**
 
0.
47
**
 
-0
.1
8 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.1
8*
 
0.
36
**
* 
0.
37
**
* 
0.
30
**
* 
0.
05
 
0.
03
 
0.
01
 
 
(0
.2
6)
 
(0
.2
4)
 
(0
.2
3)
 
(0
.1
2)
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.1
1)
 
(0
.1
1)
 
(0
.1
0)
 
(0
.0
9)
 
(0
.0
7)
 
(0
.0
6)
 
(0
.0
7)
 
H
ou
se
s 
2,
38
2.
34
**
* 
2,
36
9.
45
**
* 
2,
38
4.
41
**
* 
48
4.
14
 
38
9.
59
 
44
1.
10
 
51
2.
95
 
42
8.
70
 
45
3.
67
 
1,
28
1.
75
**
 
1,
15
2.
44
**
* 
1,
14
2.
47
**
* 
 
(8
69
.4
7)
 
(7
96
.8
8)
 
(7
95
.8
7)
 
(5
21
.1
5)
 
(4
84
.3
5)
 
(4
83
.5
7)
 
(3
80
.2
0)
 
(3
32
.9
4)
 
(3
32
.0
2)
 
(5
04
.7
7)
 
(4
27
.4
4)
 
(4
23
.5
6)
 
A
ge
d 
1,
90
6.
98
 
1,
28
8.
11
 
1,
19
5.
29
 
4,
06
3.
03
 
2,
40
7.
21
 
3,
05
5.
88
 
-2
,0
17
.5
8 
-3
,7
81
.3
6 
-3
,7
55
.8
0 
7,
54
9.
66
 
7,
66
8.
45
 
7,
59
2.
31
 
 
(9
,4
07
.7
8)
 
(8
,8
79
.3
2)
 
(8
,9
00
.3
7)
 
(6
,0
16
.2
8)
 
(6
,2
12
.1
1)
 
(6
,0
35
.8
0)
 
(4
,5
82
.2
4)
 
(3
,9
97
.8
7)
 
(3
,9
67
.9
0)
 
(5
,4
15
.5
4)
 
(4
,8
81
.7
9)
 
(4
,8
64
.7
8)
 
C
hi
ld
re
n 
-1
,3
15
.3
4 
-5
,4
54
.0
8 
-5
,7
99
.3
5 
-2
,7
58
.2
8 
-6
,2
46
.9
5 
-4
,9
49
.0
5 
-1
8,
83
8.
30
 
-2
0,
76
6.
69
 
-2
0,
36
1.
58
 
11
,0
01
.5
9 
5,
93
0.
14
 
5,
51
7.
65
 
 
(3
0,
62
9.
61
) 
(2
8,
46
9.
76
) 
(2
8,
45
2.
73
) 
(1
8,
31
1.
44
) 
(1
6,
96
0.
47
) 
(1
7,
13
1.
07
) 
(1
9,
90
8.
48
) 
(1
7,
75
2.
45
) 
(1
7,
80
7.
80
) 
(1
6,
19
9.
31
) 
(1
4,
50
2.
75
) 
(1
4,
43
2.
38
) 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
D
en
sit
y 
-1
.0
5 
-0
.9
6 
-0
.9
2 
-0
.4
4 
-0
.2
7 
-0
.3
2 
0.
10
 
0.
17
 
0.
20
 
-0
.3
5 
-0
.2
3 
-0
.2
1 
 
(0
.8
6)
 
(0
.7
8)
 
(0
.7
8)
 
(0
.4
9)
 
(0
.4
2)
 
(0
.4
2)
 
(0
.4
0)
 
(0
.3
4)
 
(0
.3
3)
 
(0
.4
8)
 
(0
.4
1)
 
(0
.4
1)
 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
gr
ow
th
 
4,
68
5.
98
 
4,
61
6.
63
 
4,
65
3.
86
 
-2
,2
10
.5
5 
-2
,1
76
.4
5 
-2
,1
74
.1
5 
-1
,6
36
.9
9 
-1
,7
70
.1
1 
-1
,7
78
.9
9 
-4
45
.5
0 
-2
37
.3
0 
-2
09
.5
7 
 
(4
,2
69
.5
7)
 
(3
,8
95
.4
9)
 
(3
,8
86
.3
0)
 
(3
,1
91
.2
7)
 
(2
,9
00
.2
6)
 
(2
,9
15
.1
9)
 
(2
,3
25
.0
4)
 
(2
,1
81
.0
9)
 
(2
,1
79
.0
0)
 
(3
,1
19
.8
8)
 
(2
,6
31
.0
2)
 
(2
,6
03
.1
8)
 
To
ta
l e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
3,
86
9.
87
 
3,
87
9.
20
 
3,
89
9.
29
 
2,
17
4.
53
 
2,
08
2.
59
 
2,
16
1.
76
 
1,
01
2.
47
 
1,
04
3.
16
 
1,
02
2.
35
 
11
5.
09
 
58
0.
74
 
62
1.
57
 
 
(3
,1
37
.6
8)
 
(2
,8
37
.2
3)
 
(2
,8
38
.7
4)
 
(2
,1
63
.7
5)
 
(1
,9
21
.4
5)
 
(1
,9
63
.5
0)
 
(1
,2
34
.5
5)
 
(1
,1
66
.2
9)
 
(1
,1
64
.8
2)
 
(1
,6
69
.0
6)
 
(1
,4
61
.4
6)
 
(1
,4
53
.6
4)
 
Lo
ca
l u
ni
t 
19
,1
79
.9
6 
19
,7
63
.9
9*
 
19
,4
98
.9
6*
 
7,
04
2.
96
 
6,
15
5.
76
 
6,
37
7.
81
 
1,
31
5.
12
 
1,
60
3.
29
 
1,
53
2.
70
 
61
5.
30
 
36
8.
31
 
27
2.
37
 
 
(1
2,
20
7.
45
) 
(1
1,
31
9.
90
) 
(1
1,
31
0.
91
) 
(7
,2
96
.9
7)
 
(6
,6
77
.0
7)
 
(6
,7
17
.9
8)
 
(5
,5
82
.8
3)
 
(5
,0
93
.5
0)
 
(5
,0
57
.1
9)
 
(7
,9
92
.9
8)
 
(7
,2
21
.5
7)
 
(7
,1
98
.2
5)
 
O
ut
lie
rs
 d
um
m
y 
10
,2
54
.3
6*
* 
10
,7
55
.4
3*
**
 
10
,7
79
.1
0*
**
 
8,
29
1.
36
**
* 
8,
38
4.
63
**
* 
8,
37
4.
56
**
* 
7,
41
5.
54
**
* 
7,
49
2.
34
**
* 
7,
51
0.
43
**
* 
8,
53
3.
51
**
* 
8,
54
3.
25
**
* 
8,
55
3.
18
**
* 
 
(4
,1
18
.3
6)
 
(3
,9
31
.8
3)
 
(3
,9
37
.9
1)
 
(1
,1
71
.6
7)
 
(1
,1
45
.3
4)
 
(1
,1
35
.0
8)
 
(9
73
.4
7)
 
(8
74
.5
8)
 
(8
73
.3
9)
 
(1
,6
82
.6
6)
 
(1
,4
68
.6
9)
 
(1
,4
57
.6
1)
 
M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 d
um
m
y 
91
.1
8 
-2
36
.3
1 
34
0.
84
 
2,
51
7.
13
 
2,
37
4.
30
 
2,
67
1.
16
 
-1
,6
30
.2
6 
-1
,0
27
.2
1 
-5
17
.4
7 
-1
99
.9
7 
-1
76
.3
8 
-3
5.
82
 
 
(3
,7
33
.1
3)
 
(3
,7
59
.7
5)
 
(3
,5
99
.9
9)
 
(1
,9
08
.5
8)
 
(1
,5
79
.0
4)
 
(1
,7
39
.1
4)
 
(1
,4
56
.6
9)
 
(1
,7
51
.0
9)
 
(1
,6
80
.1
5)
 
(9
32
.3
3)
 
(1
,0
07
.9
1)
 
(1
,0
68
.3
7)
 
C
on
st
an
t 
-3
,5
63
.9
3 
-3
,7
06
.1
0 
-3
,6
58
.3
8 
-4
76
.1
4 
-2
55
.0
8 
-2
96
.5
7 
1,
16
7.
71
 
1,
51
7.
63
 
1,
50
8.
55
 
-1
,1
79
.5
4 
-1
,6
96
.9
0 
-1
,7
83
.8
1 
 
(2
,9
36
.2
8)
 
(2
,7
14
.5
6)
 
(2
,7
11
.9
9)
 
(2
,0
46
.4
9)
 
(1
,9
60
.4
7)
 
(1
,9
84
.5
9)
 
(1
,6
69
.0
5)
 
(1
,4
47
.1
4)
 
(1
,4
43
.6
7)
 
(1
,7
19
.7
3)
 
(1
,5
07
.4
6)
 
(1
,5
03
.7
6)
 
C
om
m
un
iti
es
 d
um
m
y 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
Y
ES
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
22
3 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
0.
91
 
  
  
0.
73
 
  
  
0.
87
 
  
  
0.
82
 
  
  
20
5 Conclusions
In this study we investigated the types of interactions that can emerge (if any) among
municipalities in providing infrastructures. First, we setup a theoretical model in which
two jurisdictions provide their own infrastructures, assuming that the inhabitants of
both jurisdictions can use them. If local infrastructures are complements in use, there
is a positive interaction when jurisdictions set their own expenditures; the interaction
is instead negative if infrastructures are substitute in use by citizens. The model also
predicts that an increase in population decreases the size of the reaction function slope.
We then tested these results by using data on municipalities of the Italian Province
of Trento, finding that total infrastructures of a jurisdiction are positively linked to
neighbor’s total infrastructures. This result holds also for some specific types of in-
frastructures, namely Roads & Transport and Planning & Environment, for which the
municipalities show a complementarity relationship with their neighbors as it regards
decisions on infrastructure provisions. Also the theoretical prediction about the impact
of population on the stratetgic response has been confirmed for the same type of in-
frastructural measures, since the size of the slope of the reaction function decreases in
magnitude as population increases.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Data description and data sources 
Variables Description Source 
   
Total per capita expenditure  
 
Per capita stock of expenditure on infrastructure over the period 1990-2007 expressed 
in 2007 base year values by using deflator for gross fixed capital formation. 
 
Province of Trento 
(PAT) 
Neighbouring  total per 
capita expenditure  
 
Neighbouring average value of Total per capita expenditure on Infrastructure. 
 
Our computation 
on PAT data 
Administration & 
Management per capita 
expenditure  
 
Per capita stock on Administration and Management expenditure function over the 
period 1990-2007 expressed in 2007 base year values by using deflator for gross 
fixed capital formation. 
 
PAT 
Neighbouring Administration 
& Management per capita 
expenditure  
 
Neighbouring average value of Road and Traffic per capita expenditure. Our computation 
on PAT data 
Roads & Transport per 
capita expenditure  
 
Per capita stock on Road and Traffic expenditure function over the period 1990-2007 
expressed in 2007 base year values by using deflator for gross fixed capital 
formation. 
 
PAT 
Neighbouring Roads & and 
Transport per capita 
expenditure  
 
Neighbouring average value of Road and Traffic per capita expenditure. Our computation 
on PAT data 
Planning & Environment per 
capita expenditure  
Per capita stock on Planning and Environment expenditure function over the period 
1990-2007 expressed in 2007 base year values by using deflator for gross fixed 
capital formation. 
 
PAT 
Neighbouring Planning & 
Environment per capita 
expenditure  
 
Neighbouring average value of Road and Traffic per capita expenditure. Our computation 
on PAT data 
Neighbors spending* 
population 
 
Neighbouring total per capita expenditure and neighbouring per capita expenditure 
related to Administration and Management, Road and Traffic, Planning and 
Environment functions *population*10-3 
Our computation 
on PAT data 
 
Grants 
 
 
 
Population 
 
Children 
 
 
Stock of total per capita grants over the period 1990-2007 and stock of per capita 
grants related to Administration and Management, Road and Traffic, Planning and 
Environment functions. 
 
Average population over the period 2001-2007. 
 
Average population between 0-5 years old over the period 2001-2007 divided by 
population 
 
 
Our computation 
on PAT data  
 
 
ISTAT 
 
ISTAT 
Altitude Height of municipality above the level of  the sea ISTAT 
 
Aged Average population over 65 years old over the period 2001-2007 divided by 
population. 
 
ISTAT 
Houses 
 
Population Density 
 
Number of houses in 2001 divided by population. 
 
Population divided by area. 
ISTAT 
 
Our computation 
Total Employees 
 
Local Unit 
 
Outliers Dummy 
 
 
Metropolitan Dummy 
 
Number of public and private employees in 2001 divided by population. 
 
Number of local productive unit in 2001 divided by population. 
 
Outliers dummy=1 if the municipality is an outliers with respect to per capita 
expenditure. See Table A3. 
 
Metropolitan dummy=1 if the municipality is either Trento or Rovereto. 
ISTAT 
 
ISTAT 
 
Our computation 
 
 
Our computation 
Population Growth Average population over the period 2001-2007 divided by average population over 
the period 1991-1997 minus one. 
Our computation 
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 Table A2: Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total per capita expenditure  223 16,671.01 9,987.06 4,377.21 77,057.88 
Neighboring total per capita expenditure  223 15,920.16 5,047.97 6,487.54 28,237.72 
Neighboring total per capita expenditure*population*10-3 223 3,093.01 10,417.03 148.06 147,749.70 
Administration & Management per capita expenditure 223 3,625.57 3,395.87 513.22 24,825.35 
Neighboring Administration & Management per capita expenditure 223 3,521.14 1,783.10 1,032.28 9,032.59 
Neighboring Administration & Management per capita expenditure*population*10-3 223 734.35 3,201.84 15.11 46,962.10 
Roads & Transport per capita expenditure 223 4,688.47 3,928.27 589.79 25,643.57 
Neighboring Roads & Transport per capita expenditure  223 4,277.21 2,047.51 1,156.27 11,686.00 
Neighboring Roads & Transport per capita expenditure*population*10-3 223 781.91 2,466.72 39.05 34,585.22 
Planning & Environment per capita expenditure 223 4,172.41 3,836.61 577.56 39,446.68 
Neighboring Planning & Environment per capita expenditure  223 3,903.58 1,485.85 1,211.78 8,986.70 
Neighboring Planning & Environment per capita expenditure*population*10-3 223 739.80 2,159.21 29.84 28,659.04 
Total per capita grants 223 10,072.23 7,925.70 2,352.13 70,388.19 
Administration & Management per capita grants 223 1,729.18 1,238.74 23.93 10,450.14 
Roads & Transport per capita grants 223 2,189.10 2,157.26 264.42 17,314.44 
Planning & Environment per capita grants 223 2,229.67 2,582.99 90.81 31,624.64 
Altitude 223 709.40 294.15 85.46 1,491.12 
Population 223 2,224.06 7,865.26 108.29 109,334.90 
Houses 223 0.77 0.41 0.36 3.18 
Aged 223 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.32 
Children 223 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Population Density 223 105.27 264.90 3.72 3,699.05 
Population Growth 223 0.07 0.07 -0.18 0.31 
Total employees 223 0.26 0.16 0.06 0.98 
Local Unit 223 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.37 
Notes: The spatial matrix used to compute the neighboring variables is a binary contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are neighbors if they share a border, and is row-standardized
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Table A3: Municipalities outliers 
 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
Q1 9507.48 1645.68 2255.12 2047.08 
Q3 20498.20 4212.22 5691.41 5134.31 
IQR 10990.72 2566.54 3436.28 3087.24 
Q1 –1.5*IQR e Q3 + 1.5*IQR -6978.60 36984.28 -2204.13 8062.03 -2899.30 10845.83 -2583.78 9765.17 
Number of mild outliers 9 10 6 3 
Q1 –3*IQR e Q3 + 3*IQR -23464.68 53470.36 -6053.94 11911.84 -8053.73 16000.26 -7214.64 14396.03 
Number of severe outliers 2 7 7 6 
Municipalities 
ALBIANO 44965.76 ALBIANO 24825.35 AMBLAR 15036.89 CENTA SAN NICOLO' 15202.88 
BRESIMO 41930.06 BOCENAGO 11175.95 BRESIMO 19096.17 DAONE 11027.09 
BRIONE 37741.92 BRIONE 13511.83 CAGNO' 15326.98 LARDARO 18115.57 
CASTEL CONDINO 42865.77 CADERZONE 8814.79 CASTEL CONDINO 17584.93 LUSERNA 12485.57 
GARNIGA 43060.11 CASTEL CONDINO 9132.70 DARE' 10885.35 MASSIMENO 20114.78 
GRAUNO 40976.11 CASTELFONDO 9509.00 GRAUNO 24137.27 PALU' DEL FERSINA 18117.79 
MASSIMENO 44222.98 CINTE TESINO 12137.98 MASSIMENO 12692.81 SAGRON MIS 11081.02 
PALU' DEL FERSINA 66917.53 DON 14464.66 PALU' DEL FERSINA 25643.57 TERRES 16701.57 
PIEVE TESINO 39948.09 GARNIGA 20772.40 PRASO 11988.20 VIGNOLA FALESINA 39446.68 
SAGRON MIS 44057.73 GIUSTINO 8306.35 PREZZO 17483.32   
VIGNOLA FALESINA 77057.88 GRUMES 11120.82 SAGRON MIS 22423.47   
  LONA-LASES 12860.40 STREMBO 12627.79   
  MASSIMENO 10839.78 VIGNOLA FALESINA 19491.20   
  PIEVE TESINO 22963.56     
  RONZONE 9163.028     
  TIARNO DI SOTTO 10135.25     
  VIGNOLA FALESINA 8643.582     
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Table A4: Non spatial model – OLS regression 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Grants 0.87*** 0.38** 0.82*** 0.72*** 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
Altitude 5.09*** 1.17 2.09*** 0.69 
 (1.40) (0.90) (0.72) (1.00) 
Population -0.07* -0.06* -0.03** -0.03* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Houses 2,620.32*** 321.17 585.34 1,287.76** 
 (910.86) (535.36) (379.05) (500.74) 
Aged 2,814.87 2,279.31 -2,118.45 7,334.39 
 (9,310.60) (6,303.39) (4,681.13) (5,380.26) 
Children 8,782.41 -6,071.13 -8,850.30 10,936.83 
 (30,648.31) (18,043.98) (20,418.58) (16,040.36) 
Population Density -0.96 -0.30 0.33 -0.30 
 (0.87) (0.46) (0.38) (0.47) 
Population growth 3,748.01 -2,319.11 -2,362.06 -411.85 
 (4,317.05) (3,293.26) (2,347.50) (3,111.54) 
Total employees 4,471.62 1,862.30 1,032.61 103.64 
 (3,204.03) (2,092.94) (1,218.65) (1,670.92) 
Local unit 16,134.72 6,497.92 -355.68 240.67 
 (12,747.64) (7,280.13) (5,619.08) (7,940.58) 
Outliers dummy 9,698.34** 8,416.57*** 7,551.73*** 8,579.50*** 
 (4,124.96) (1,247.66) (1,049.15) (1,661.39) 
Metropolitan dummy 3,700.99 1,266.15 963.65 453.63 
 (2,435.73) (1,379.38) (1,120.07) (1,083.12) 
Constant -2,795.09 -479.78 1,198.57 -1,299.48 
 (2,968.83) (2,009.99) (1,728.93) (1,734.73) 
Communities dummy YES YES YES YES 
Observations 223 223 223 223 
R-squared 0.91 0.72 0.86 0.82 
Robust LM test for spatial error dependence 0.84 0.43 6.05** 5.44** 
Robust LM test for spatial lag dependence 3.53* 0.60 9.50*** 2.10 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The spatial weights matrix used to compute the test is a binary, contiguity-based one, 
according to which two municipalities are neighbors if they share a common border and it is row-standardized. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table A5: Non spatial model and interaction with population – OLS regression 
  Total Administration & Management Roads & Transport Planning & Environment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Neighbors spending * Population -0.17 0.06 -0.48* -0.26 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.27) (0.17) 
Grants 0.86*** 0.38** 0.81*** 0.71*** 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
Altitude 5.39*** 1.12 2.40*** 0.67 
 (1.39) (0.92) (0.75) (1.00) 
Population 0.17 -0.09 0.13 0.04 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) 
Houses 2,586.13*** 324.51 520.00 1,282.95** 
 (912.68) (534.95) (379.75) (502.05) 
Aged 2,950.51 2,244.79 -2,456.38 7,579.84 
 (9,329.84) (6,338.17) (4,698.42) (5,331.12) 
Children 9,516.40 -6,226.33 -8,470.91 11,118.14 
 (30,790.85) (18,158.54) (20,440.38) (16,034.68) 
Population Density -1.08 -0.28 0.26 -0.35 
 (0.89) (0.46) (0.40) (0.48) 
Population growth 3,624.18 -2,326.46 -2,505.92 -445.23 
 (4,315.08) (3,303.50) (2,342.38) (3,114.20) 
Total employees 4,394.32 1,899.96 1,037.81 109.83 
 (3,213.64) (2,123.14) (1,208.27) (1,665.94) 
Local unit 16,959.44 6,358.39 -81.32 632.79 
 (12,973.07) (7,326.33) (5,673.08) (7,972.03) 
Outliers dummy 9,645.76** 8,424.25*** 7,541.33*** 8,521.32*** 
 (4,133.69) (1,252.12) (1,047.43) (1,667.64) 
Metropolitan dummy 2,142.87 1,522.80 -121.78 -165.00 
 (3,052.42) (1,590.26) (1,264.99) (916.63) 
Constant -2,895.81 -395.41 1,230.17 -1,159.33 
 (2,996.47) (2,053.22) (1,737.68) (1,753.69) 
Communities dummy YES YES YES YES 
Observations 223 223 223 223 
R-squared 0.91 0.72 0.86 0.82 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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